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When the operators ask for the price
In a fictional service network, independent operators ask the brand to set a common price. The brand also operates its own unit. Their competing relationships and communications matter: calling the resulting policy vertical does not remove possible coordination between competitors.
A supplier’s unilateral policy, a supplier/dealer agreement and competitor coordination are different situations. Distinguish suggested from required prices and identify discounts, advertising support or other methods used to induce compliance.
What Leegin changed—and what it did not decide
In Leegin v. PSKS (2007), the Supreme Court replaced the prior Dr. Miles federal per-se treatment of vertical minimum resale-price agreements with rule-of-reason analysis. That means examination of the actual arrangement and competitive context, not automatic approval. The Court reversed and remanded; this was not a ruling that every such policy or the particular arrangement was lawful.
The cited record establishes that standard and disposition, not an independently checked later merits result. State-law treatment can differ.
Do not treat different restrictions as one policy
Minimum advertised price (MAP), most-favoured-nation (MFN) terms linking treatment to other parties, territories and customer allocations need their actual terms examined. Federal, state and international rules may differ. A stated quality or service-investment purpose does not itself settle the competitive effects.
Scope
- No pricing, territory or customer restriction is cleared here, and no complete antitrust case-law survey is supplied.
Next step
Examine the actual price proposal and competing relationships before announcing a required network price.
Sources & review notes
Federal Trade Commission
Passage, dates and research notes
official-guidance · Vertical price/customer/territory restraints; competitor coordination; state-law caveat
some state antitrust laws
Read complete main guidance and Q&A, not only the opening statement. Current guidance distinguishes federal rule-of-reason treatment, state differences, manufacturer decisions, competitor coordination, territorial restrictions, MAP and MFN examples. No particular pricing policy is approved.
Supreme Court of the United States; Library of Congress U.S. Reports archive
Passage, dates and research notes
primary · Majority introduction, procedural facts, PartsII–III discussion and PartsIV–V holding/disposition
Vertical price restraints are to be judged
Obtained complete U.S. Reports opinion including dissent from LOC after the old Supreme Court slip-opinion URL returned404. Read scoped majority facts, legal-standard discussion and final holding/disposition; the guide states only the federal legal-standard change and reversal/remand. It does not declare Leegin’s actual policy lawful or recite a later merits outcome. Current FTC guidance independently confirms the federal standard and state-law limitation.
Detailed rule records (1)
The2007 Leegin majority replaced federal per-se treatment of vertical minimum resale-price restraints with rule-of-reason review and reversed/remanded. FTC guidance distinguishes state-law differences and competitor coordination; a vertical label does not immunise horizontal effects.
Manufacturer-imposed requirements: federal antitrust guidance Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 US877 (2007)Keep this reading in your learning library.
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